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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EFFORT TO
SIMPLIFY TRUTH IN LENDING
Elwin Griffith*
Since the Truth in Lending Act waspassed in 1968 numer-
ous ambiguities have arisen. Congress and the courts have
made several attempts to resolve these d~ijculties. Dean Grfith
discusses the effects of the remedial legislation and recent court
decisions on controversies arising both before and after the ef-
fective date of the most recent legislation. The discussion in-
cludes the types of transactions covered by the Act, rescission
rights andprocedures, civil liability for violations of the Act, at-
torney's fees in Truth in Lending actions, the definition of a
creditor, late payments, and disclosure of security interests.
Dean Grifth also suggests solutionsfor several remainingprob-
lem areas.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1968, Congress passed the Truth in Lending Act' (Act) to clar-
ify credit terms for the average consumer. There was a perception that
the cost of credit was shrouded in vague, mystical terms and that credi-
tors failed to inform or to educate the public about credit transactions.2
Whether or not this was true, the Act revolutionized the area of con-
* Dean, DePaul University College of Law. B.A., 1960, Long Island University; J.D., 1963,
Brooklyn Law School; LL.M., 1964, New York University College of Law. The author is grateful
to Lauren Weil, J.D., 1983, DePaul University College of Law, for her research assistance.
1. Act of May 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
H 1601-1667e (1982)).
2. For example, Paul H. Douglas, Chairman of the National Commission on Urban Affairs,
made the following observations about interest rate disclosure during the Senate Hearings on the
Truth in Lending bill
It is only in the field of consumer credit that confusion and obfuscation prevail. Here
borrowers are being forced to pay interest on amounts which they have already repaid.
They are not told this, however. In fact, this is carefully concealed from them.
When the consumer is faced with this jumble of rate methods and complicated financial
terms, it is no wonder that he throws up his hands and asks merely to see the size of the
monthly payments. For unless he is a skilled mathematician, he will be utterly confused
and thoroughly misled if he attempts to compare rates quoted by various lenders.
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sumer credit. In the name of providing adequate disclosure, it intro-
duced terminology 3 which until then was unknown to many consumers
and authorized the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board
(Board) to issue regulations to implement its purposes.4 Soon thereaf-
ter, the Board issued Regulation Z,5 a product of careful drafting.
With the passage of time, the Act and Regulation Z provided fer-
tile ground for litigation. Some creditors disclosed too much or mis-
read the regulations altogether. At times, the statute and the regulation
seemed clear until the Board's interpretation was published.6 Confu-
sion resulted when the courts and the Board could not agree on a uni-
form interpretation of a statutory or regulatory provision.7
Occasionally, the federal circuits disagreed among themselves.'
By 1980 it was clear that the Act needed to be simplified. Accord-
ingly, Congress enacted the Truth in Lending Simplification and Re-
form Act9 (Simplification Act), pursuant to which the Board amended
Regulation Z. t0 In the process, several interesting issues arose. The
Truth in Lending-1967" Hearings on S5 Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the
Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1969).
3. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a)(2)(A) (1982) (providing for disclosure of the "amount
financed"); id § 1638(a)(4) (providing for an "annual percentage rate").
4. Pub. L. No. 90-321, § 105, 82 Stat. 146, 148 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1604
(1982)).
5. 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1-.1002 (1970) (current version at 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1-.29 (1983)).
6. Between 1969 and 1980 the Board issued numerous official interpretations to guide credi-
tors in making disclosures. A creditor's bona fide conformity with such interpretations shield him
from liability. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(f) (1982). In Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555
(1980), the Supreme Court, granting a high degree of deference to the Board's interpretations of
the Act, held that a staff opinion should be dispositive unless it is demonstrably irrational. Id at
565.
7. For example, in Milhollin v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 588 F.2d 753, 757-58 (9th Cir. 1978),
rev'd, 444 U.S. 555 (1980), and St. Germain v. Bank of Hawaii, 573 F.2d 572, 577 (9th Cir. 1977),
the Ninth Circuit rejected the Board's view that the creditor need not disclose the right of acceler-
ation. For the Board's opinion, see Official Staff Interpretation No. FC-0054, 12 C.F.R. app. at
726 (1982) (creditor need not disclose right of acceleration).
8. For example, the Fifth, Seventh and Eighth Circuits grant double recovery to joint obli-
gors for statutory violations relating to a single transaction. In contrast, the Fourth, Ninth and
Tenth Circuits allow only one recovery in such circumstances. Compare White v. World Fin., 653
F.2d 147, 152 (5th Cir. 1981) (each joint and severally liable signer entitled to statutory recovery)
and Andersen v. Farmers Bank, 640 F.2d 1347, 1349 (8th Cir. 1981) (each joint obligor may
collect full damages) and Mirabal v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 537 F.2d 871, 881-83 (7th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978), with Riggs v. Government Employees Fin. Corp.,
623 F.2d 68, 75 (9th Cir. 1980) (joint debtors allowed only one recovery) and Mason v. General
Fin. Corp., 542 F.2d 1226, 1235 (4th Cir. 1976) (husband and wife allowed only one recovery) and
Hinkle v. Rock Springs Nat'l Bank, 538 F.2d 295,297 (10th Cir. 1976) (single recovery allowed for
joint obligors).
9. Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 168 (1980) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693(r)
(1982)).
10. 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1-.29 (1983).
2
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 19 [1983], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol19/iss1/2
TULSA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19:30
seemingly simple procedure provided for the consumer to rescind a
credit transaction 1 has caused great difficulty for both consumer and
creditor. Before the passage of the Simplification Act, the courts had
no statutory authority to vary the procedure.'Z This inflexibility in the
statutory structure left creditors uncertain about their rights when a
consumer rescinded. This Article discusses this area of uncertainty and
examines the changes brought about by the revised statute.
This Article also discusses other problems which have arisen under
the Act. First, it focuses upon the consumer's right to attorney's fees 13
and considers whether creditors have a statutory right to a setoff
against a consumer's claims. Next, this Article addresses the question
of whether public policy should allow a consumer to release his Truth
in Lending claims. Finally, some consideration is given to the effect of
the Simplification Act upon the disclosure of security interests' 4 and
late payments. 15
II. TRANSACTIONS COVERED
Regulation Z applies to any transaction in which a creditor regu-
larly extends credit for personal, family, or household purposes that is
subject to a finance charge or that requires payment pursuant to a writ-
ten agreement in more than four installments. 16  One difficulty arises
when a creditor provides credit in a particular transaction which is pay-
able in four installments or less, or which does not impose a finance
charge. In that individual transaction a seller, retailer or a lender is not
11. 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (1982); 12 C.F.R. § 226.15(a) (1983) (open-end credit); id § 226.23(a)
(closed-end credit). The Simplification Act changed the period in which the creditor must act on
the consumer's rescission from 10 to 20 days. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (1982); 12 C.F.R.
§§ 226.15(d)(2), 226.23(d)(2) (1983). Once the rescission has been acted upon, the consumer must
tender the creditor's property to the creditor. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (1982); 12 C.F.R.
§§ 226.15(d)(3), 226.23(d)(3) (1983). If the creditor does not take possession of his property within
20 days the consumer may keep it without further obligation. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (1982); 12
C.F.R. §§ 226.15(d)(3), 226.23(d)(3) (1983).
12. The Simplification Act added new language that the procedures prescribed could be
modified by a court. Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 612, 94 Stat. 175 (1980) (codified at, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1635(b) (1982)); see also 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.15(d)(4), 226.23(d)(4) (1983) (implementing
regulations).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3) (1982).
14. 12 C.F.R. § 226.18(m) (1983).
15. 12 C.F.R. § 226.18(1) (1983).
16. Regulation Z applies to a transaction when the following conditions are met:
(i) The credit is offered or extended to consumers; (ii) the offering or extension of credit
is done regularly; (iii) the credit is subject to a finance charge or is payable by a written
agreement in more than 4 installments; and (iv) the credit is primarily for personal, fam-
ily, or household purposes.
12 C.F.R. § 226.1(c)(1) (1983) (footnote omitted).
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technically a creditor as defined in the regulation.' 7 While one court
has ruled that it would not be in keeping with the purpose of Truth in
Lending to apply the four-installment requirement on a case-by-case
basis,' 8 the Official Staff Commentary of the Federal Reserve Board
suggests that a creditor must pass the test in each individual transaction
in order that the transaction be subject to regulation.'9 It is also to be
noted that an agreement to pay the debt in more than four installments
must be in writing to be covered, whereas an obligation to pay the
finance charge is covered even if it is oral. 0
Another requirement of Truth in Lending is that the transaction
must involve credit which is primarily for personal, family or house-
hold purposes.2' It is sometimes difficult to separate business transac-
tions from personal transactions. For example, in Anderson v. Rocky
Mountain Federal Savings & Loan22 the consumers purchased a dam-
aged mobile home to repair and resell at a profit.2 3 Because the con-
sumers had never lived in the property and never had any intention of
doing so, the court found that they had purchased the mobile home for
a business purpose and that the transaction was not subject to Regula-
17. The Act defines "creditor" as follows:
(i) The term "creditor" refers only to a person who both (1) regularly extends, whether in
connection with loans, sales of property or services, or otherwise, consumer credit which
is payable by agreement in more than four installments or for which the payment of a
finance charge is or may be required; and (2) is the person to whom the debt arising from
the consumer credit transaction is initially payable on the face of the evidence of indebt-
edness or, if there is no such evidence of indebtedness, by agreement.
Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 702(a), 96 Stat. 1469,
1538 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1602(f) (Supp. V 1981)). "A person regularly extends consumer
credit only if it extended credit more than 25 times (or more than 5 times for transactions secured
by a dwelling) in the preceding calendar year." 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(17) n.3 (1983).
18. See Boyajian v. Kingstown Furniture Co. (In re Maxwell), 22 Bankr. 958 (D.R.I. 1982)
(construing old Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(s)).
19. The Board takes this position on the definition of "creditor":
1. Prerequisites. This test is composed of 2 requirements, both of which must be met in
order for a particular credit extension to be subject to the regulation and for the credit
extension to count towards satisfaction of the numerical tests mentioned in footnote 3 to
§ 226.2(a)(17). First, there must be either or both of the following:
A written (rather than oral) agreement to pay in more than 4 installments. A letter
that merely confirms an oral agreement does not constitute a written agreement for pur-
poses of the definition.
A finance charge imposed for the credit. The obligation to pay the finance charge
need not be in writing.
Second, the obligation must be payable to the person in order for that person to be
considered a creditor. If an obligation is made payable to "bearer," the creditor is the
one who initially accepts the obligation.
FRB Official Staff Interpretations para. 2(a)(17)(i), 12 C.F.R. Supp. 1 at 670 (1983).
20. Id
21. 12 C.F.R. § 226.1(c)(1) (1983), quotedsupra note 16.
22. 651 P.2d 269 (Wyo. 1982).
23. Id at 270.
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tion Z.24 In determining whether credit has been extended for business
purposes, the Official Staff Interpretations of the Board suggests consid-
eration of the following factors: (1) the relationship between the bor-
rower's principal occupation and the acquisition; (2) the extent to
which the borrower is personally involved in managing the acquisition;
(3) the ratio of income from the acquisition to the overall income of the
borrower; (4) the size of the transaction; and (5) the borrower's state-
ment of the purpose for the loan. 5
Another interesting situation arises when a consumer seeks legal
services. If a consumer purchases personal property for his home and
seeks a remedy against the seller, the deferment of legal fees incurred in
that action might subject the transaction to the disclosure
requirements.26
Credit is not primarily for personal, family, or household use sim-
ply because the security offered for the loan is the obligor's personal
holdings.2 7 A loan obtained to purchase a business would be exempt
even if it was secured by the residence of the guarantor.28 The impor-
tance of the purpose of the credit was indicated in American Express
Co. v. Koerner,29 where the Supreme Court held that issuing credit
cards to a corporation for the use of the corporation's officers was not
an extension of consumer credit. Even though the officers were jointly
and severally liable for charges to the cards, the credit was extended
because of the company's credit rating and was to be used primarily for
business; therefore, the transactions did not involve consumer credit.
24. Id at 273.
25. FRB Official Staff Interpretations para. 3(a)(2), 12 C.F.R. Supp. 1 at 675 (1983).
26. Dougherty v. Hoolihan, Neils, & Boland, Ltd., 531 F. Supp. 717 (D. Minn. 1982). In
Dougherty, the plaintiffs hired defendant attorney to determine, inter alia, whether a Bank had
misapplied funds in connection with the foreclosure sale of personal property from plaintifi's
farm. .d. at 720. The defendant acquired a promissory note secured by a mortgage on the plain-
tiffs' farm as consideration for additional services by defendant. The court held that the transac-
tion was a "consumer credit transaction" within the meaning of § 103(h), 15 U.S.C. § 1602(h)
(Supp. V 1981), because the legal services rendered had to do with the plaintiffs' personal prop-
erty. Id. at 721.
27. Smith v. Chapman, 436 F. Supp. 58, 61 (W.D. Tex. 1977); FRB Official Staff Interpreta-
tions para. 3(a)(2), 12 C.F.R. Supp. I at 675 (1983).
28. Poe v. First Nat'l Bank, 597 F.2d 895 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam); see also Weingarten v.
First Mortgage Co., 466 F. Supp. 349 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (mem.).
29. 452 U.S. 233 (1981).
30. The precise question involved in American Express Co. was whether the creditor had to
comply with § 161(a) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1606(a) (1982) (correction of billing errors). The
Court recognized three possibilities for the use of the credit card. If the account was primarily for
consumer purposes, then Truth in Lending would apply even in the case of an occasional business
use. If a transaction-by-transaction approach was used, then Truth in Lending would apply if the
specific transaction in dispute was for a consumer purpose. The third alternative was a combina-
[Vol. 19:30
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III. RIGHT OF RESCISSION
A. Procedural Problems
Except for specific exemptions, 31 a consumer has the right to re-
scind a credit transaction in which his principal dwelling is subject to a
security interest.32 The right to rescind is available not only to a person
who is obligated to pay the debt under the transaction, but also to any
person whose ownership interest in the dwelling will be subject to a
security lien, even though the latter has not signed the credit contract.33
However, the mere existence of a security interest in the consumer's
principal dwelling does not make a transaction rescindable. The trans-
action must be one for consumer purposes, and the lien must affect
property which is used as the consumer's principal dwelling at the time
the security interest is created.34  Furthermore, the security interest
must arise as a result of the credit agreement. A mechanic's lien ob-
tained by a contractor because of work done on a homeowner's prop-
erty does not create a rescindable transaction if the contractor is not
involved in the credit transaction between the lender and the home-
owner. 35 But if the contractor is a creditor in the transaction, then his
security interest retained in connection with the credit transaction will
tion of the two approaches by applying § 161(a) to disputes that flow from an account that is
characterized as a consumer credit account and also to disputes about a specific transaction that is
an extension of consumer credit, even if the general purpose of the account is primarily for busi-
ness. The Court decided the case without using any of the alternatives. 452 U.S. at 242. The
Simplification Act and revised Regulation Z do not change the billing error provisions applicable
to this situation. 15 U.S.C. § 1666 (1982); 12 C.F.R. § 226.13 (1983).
31. Section 125(e)(1) provides that the obligor's right to rescind does not apply to the
following:
(A) a residential mortgage transaction as defined in section 1602(w) of this title;
(B) a transaction which constitutes a refinancing or consolidation (with no new ad-
vances) of the principal balance then due and any accrued and unpaid finance charges of
an existing extension of credit by the same creditor secured by an interest in the same
property;
(C) a transaction in which an agency of a State is the creditor, or
(D) advances under a preexisting open end credit plan if a security interest has already
been retained or acquired and such advances are in accordance with a previously estab-
lished credit limit for such plan.
(2) The provisions of paragraph (1)(D) shall cease to be effective 3 years after the effec-
tive date of the Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act.
15 U.S.C. § 1635(e)(1) (1982). Section 103(w) defines "residential mortgage transaction!' as "a
transaction in which a mortgage, deed of trust, purchase money security interest arising under an
installment sales contract, or equivalent consensual security interest is created or retained in the
consumer's dwelling to finance the acquisition or initial construction of such dwelling." 15 U.S.C.
§ 1602(w) (1982); 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(24) (1983);seealso 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.15(0, 226.23(0 (1983).
32. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (1982); 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.15(a), 226.23(a) (1983).
33. FRB Official Staff Interpretations para. 23(a)(1), 12 C.F.R. Supp. 1 at 729 (1983).
34. 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(I1), (12) (1982).
35. FRB Official Staff Interpretations para. 23(a)(1), 12 C.F.R. Supp. 1 at 729 (1983).
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give rise to the right of rescission.36
One of the difficulties in rescission has been the procedure re-
quired by the statute.37 When a consumer exercises his right of rescis-
sion, the lien on his property is automatically void.38  As a rule,
creditors have not been pleased about the prospect of having an un-
secured loan if the consumer balks at returning the proceeds. There-
fore, some creditors have taken it upon themselves to condition the
right of rescission upon the consumer's willingness to repay the debt.39
The difficulty with that approach is that the statute and the regulation
require the creditor to terminate the security interest and return all
money and property within twenty days of the notice of rescission,40
and the debtor is not obligated to do anything, including returning the
loan proceeds, until the creditor has acted. Even before the revised
statute authorized a variation of the stipulated procedure in appropri-
ate cases, some courts ignored the apparently strict language of the stat-
ute if the debtor kept the creditor's funds.4 1 Other courts were not
afraid to act if a debtor was simply unable to restore the creditor to his
original condition.42 It was difficult, however, for a creditor to adopt
protective measures on his own if he was unsure of a debtor's position
on restitution.43
36. Id
37. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (1982); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(d) (1983).
38. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (1982); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(d)(1) (1983).
39. Powers v. Sims & Levin, 542 F.2d 1216, 1218 (4th Cir. 1976) (creditor's refusal to rescind
until improvements or reasonable value returned); Palmer v. Wilson, 502 F.2d 860, 861 (9th Cir.
1974) (refusal to rescind until proceeds tendered).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (1982); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(d)(2) (1983).
41. See Rudisell v. Fifth Third Bank, 622 F.2d 243, 254 (6th Cir. 1980) (court may condition
return of debtor's monies upon debtor's tender); Powers v. Sims & Levin, 542 F.2d 1216, 1222 (4th
Cir. 1976) (debtor may not rescind without making restitution).
42. See Nietert v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 263 Ark. 251, 565 S.W.2d 4, cert. denied, 439
U.S. 965 (1978). InNietert, defendant debtors obtained a loan from the plaintiff bank, which they
secured by a mortgage on their farm. Defendants exercised their right to rescind the transaction,
but because they were unable to secure a second loan, they failed to tender the principal amount
due the plaintiff. The bank then instituted foreclosure proceedings. Defendants claimed, how-
ever, that they were not required to tender the principal sum of the loan as the bank had refused to
release the mortgage on defendants' property in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (1976). The
Arkansas Supreme Court rejected defendants' contentions, upholding the bank's right to retain its
security interest in the farm until it received repayment of the loan. 263 Ark. at 261, 565 S.W.2d at
9. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (1976) required the creditor to take action to terminate any security interest
created under a transaction within ten days after notice of rescission.
43. Furthermore, failure to act within the statutory period may subject a creditor to civil
liability under 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1982) in addition to the rescission remedy. Harris v. Tower
Loan, 609 F.2d 120, 123 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 826 (1980); see also Etta v. Seaboard
Enters., Inc., 674 F.2d 913, 919 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (statutory damages and rescission allowed);
Ljepava v. M.L.S.C. Properties, Inc., 511 F.2d 935, 945 (9th Cir. 1975) (Act authorizes both statu-
tory damages and rescission) (citing Eby v. Reb Realty Inc., 495 F.2d 646, 651 (9th Cir. 1974));
7
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The procedural problems of rescission have been evident since
Sosa v. Fite.4 In Sosa, the consumer rescinded a home improvement
contract and at the same time offered to return the property to the cred-
itor. However, the creditor did not respond to the consumer and took
no action to terminate the security interest in the consumer's property.
The Fifth Circuit found that the creditor had forfeited the loan pro-
ceeds because he did not act within ten days of the consumer's rescis-
sion and tender.45 The court recognized the existence of an orderly,
statutory procedure for putting the parties in their original positions.
However, it regarded the creditor's silence as an attempt to abort the
procedure and felt that the dispute could be solved only by treating the
consumer's tender as the benchmark for the eventual forfeiture of the
creditor's proceeds.46 The court in Sosa accelerated the period in
which the consumer could recover his property. The second ten-day
period ordinarily would not haave begun until the creditor had acqui-
esced in the debtor's rescission by taking the necessary steps to termi-
nate the security interest. It was only because the creditor failed to do
anything in his ten-day response time that the tender had the effect of
discharging the consumer from any further responsibility.47
Powers v. Sims & Levin48 reinforced rescission as an equitable doc-
trine. The consumer thought that he could enforce his right of rescis-
sion even though he had offered to return only part of the
consideration. The Fourth Circuit disagreed. The court stressed that it
could not enforce the right of rescission in the face of the consumer's
failure to honor the statutory requirements. 49 It was one thing to re-
main silent on the question of returning the consideration, but it was
quite another to affirm one's intention not to make restitution. Because
there was nothing in the statute to prevent the court from exercising its
equitable powers, 50 the consumer received very little sympathy when
Poirrier v. Charlie's Chevrolet, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 894, 896 (E.D. Mo. 1978) (double recovery
allowed). But see Bostwick v. Cohen, 319 F. Supp. 875, 877 (N.D. Ohio 1970) (act of rescission
precludes recovery of damages).
44. 498 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1974).
45. Id at 118-19.
46. Id. at 119 n.6. In 1974, when the Fifth Circuit decided Sosa, § 125(b) of the Act required
the creditor to act within 10 days of rescission. The creditor then had an additional 10 days to
retrieve his property from the debtor. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (1976).
47. 498 F.2d at 119. But see Gerasta v. Hibernia Nat'l Bank, 575 F.2d 580 (5th Cir. 1978)
(per curiam) (no discharge of debt where consumers refused to tender the proceeds of the loan).
48. 542 F.2d 1216 (4th Cir. 1976).
49. Id at 1221.
50. Id at 1222; see also Etta v. Seaboard Enters., 674 F.2d 913 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (rescission
viewed as an equitable remedy; court conditioned return of monies to debtor on return of property
19831
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he attempted to rescind the transaction without promising to restore the
creditor to his former position. Therefore, the court conditioned the
rescission on the debtor's return of the creditor's proceeds."
The tender doctrine articulated by the Fifth Circuit in Sosa has
remained viable and was further confirmed in Rudisell v. Ffith Third
Bank. 2 Unfortunately, the consumers had made no tender and the
court would not let them keep the property which was the subject of the
transaction. Had the proper tender been made, the court seemed will-
ing to allow the consumers to keep the property installed on their
premises.53 It is clear, therefore, that the consumer cannot impose ad-
ditional conditions on the creditor when he makes his tender. The stat-
ute sets out the responsibilities of the parties, and the tender loses its
force if it is circumscribed by the debtor's unwarranted demands. 4
There is no doubt that the tender recognized in Sosa went a long
way toward prodding the creditor into action, even though the old act
did not afford the creditor much time in which to decide on a course of
action. Now that the Simplification Act has extended the response pe-
riod to twenty days,55 the creditor has a reasonable time to decide
whether to act on the consumer's rescission. Furthermore, it is not nec-
essary for the creditor to complete all the actions required of him under
the statute within the twenty-day period. He is on safe ground if he
merely begins the process within that period, as long as he follows
through to completion. 6 It is also significant that if the consumer is
tendering property back to the creditor, the consumer has an option of
making that tender either at his residence or at the property's loca-
tion. 7 However, if the consumer is tendering money, that tender must
be made at the creditor's place of business. 58 That requirement for
tendering money may have an effect in some cases on the consumer's
ability to follow through on his tender and, in that sense, may prevent
to creditor); Rudisell v. Fifth Third Bank, 622 F.2d 243 (6th Cir. 1980) (court found nothing
inconsistent about allowing both statutory damages and rescission but conditioned the granting of
rescission on plaintiffs repayment of loan to creditor).
51. 542 F.2d at 1221-22.
52. 622 F.2d 243 (6th Cir. 1980).
53. Id at 254.
54. See Kovalik v. Delta Inv. Corp., 125 Ariz. 602, 607, 611 P.2d 955, 960 (Ct, App. 1980)
(consumer's tender not valid when conditioned upon return of payments and payment of $1,000
penalty by creditor).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (1982).
56. FRB Official Staff Interpretations para. 23(d)(2), 12 C.F.R. Supp. I at 731 (1983).
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him from accelerating the period within which the creditor is forced to
act.
B. Return of Proceeds or Property
The statute requires the debtor to return the creditor's property,
once rescission has occurred. Sometimes the consumer cannot return
the property because he has used it to his own advantage. 9 In that case
the consumer may tender the property's reasonable value if return of
the property in kind would be impracticable or inequitable.6" Of
course, if the lender advances funds for the debtor to purchase materi-
als for remodeling, the debtor should not be given the option of tender-
ing the reasonable value of those materials. He should be asked to
return the money itself, since the property subject to the transaction is
the loan proceeds and not the remodeling materials. In Brown v. Na-
tional Permanent Federal Savings & Loan Association,61 the Circuit
Court for the District of Columbia remanded the parties to the trial
court for a determination of whether the debtor had obtained any ben-
efit from the work performed on her house and if so, whether rescission
should be conditioned upon the debtor's paying the reasonable value of
the work. In Brown the bank made advances to the contractor from the
consumer's loan as the work progressed. The lender's only interest was
to ensure that the contractor was performing in accordance with the
financing transaction. However, the property which the creditor deliv-
ered to the obligor was the money, the actual proceeds of the loan. It
certainly was not the remodeling materials which improved the
debtor's home. The statute required the consumer to return the credi-
tor's property, but the property was the loan amount, not the materials,
and the language dealing with the impracticability of returning the
property in kind therefore was not applicable, since the money could
have been returned.62
The point was brought home in Myrick v. Finance America Credit
Corp. ,63 where the defendant was the assignee of a home improvement
contractor. The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals pointed out that if
the defendant had lent money to the plaintiff, the defendant would be
59. Baker Bank & Trust Co. v. Matthews, 401 So. 2d 1246, 1251 (La. Ct. App. 1981) (pro-
ceeds of loan used for bills and living expenses; consumer unable to repay principal).
60. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (1982); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(d)(3) (1983).
61. 683 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
62. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (1982).
63. 404 So. 2d 700 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981).
19831
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entitled to the "net proceeds of the loan."'  But the defendant assignee
had purchased the home improvement contract from the contractor,
and the property subject to restitution was siding installed by the con-
tractor. Therefore, if it was impracticable or inequitable for the home-
owner to return that property, then it was proper to invoke the
"reasonable value" substitute in the statute.65
If the debtor has received proceeds and has applied them to the
improvement of his property, then he ought not to have the option of
paying back less than the amount that he has received from the creditor
simply because he may be dissatisfied with the product of his invest-
ment.66 It is too easy a resolution to give the debtor the opportunity to
repay the reasonable value of property, and thus allow him to reduce
the amount repayable on the basis of his dissatisfaction.67
Of course, if the debtor has to return the reasonable value of the
improvements to his property, the obligation does not include the rea-
sonable value of the services performed by the creditor.6 8 The purpose
of the rescission statute is to put the parties in their original positions to
the extent possible; it is unfair to require the debtor to pay the creditor
for services which have been performed in spite of the rescission.
In Hull v. Bowest Corp.6 9 the creditor sought the best of both
worlds. The consumers wanted the creditor to cancel the lien on their
property since they had rescinded the transaction. The Colorado Court
of Appeals agreed with the creditor's argument that the creditor should
remove the lien from the consumer's property only if the consumer re-
paid the outstanding mortgage loan.70 The creditor also recovered a
64. Id at 704.
65. Id; see also Rudisell v. Fifth Third Bank, 622 F.2d 243, 254 (6th Cir. 1980) (return of
property impossible; debtors must tender reasonable value); Dougherty v. Hoolihan, Neils, & Bo-
land, Ltd., 531 F. Supp. 717 (D. Minn. 1982) (return of reasonable value); cf Bookhart v. Mid-
Penn Consumer Discount Co., 559 F. Supp. 208 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (consumer should return entire
proceeds to lender even though dissatisfied with work of third-party contractor).
66. No doubt the consumer in Brown, 683 F.2d 444, was dissatisfied with the quality of the
home improvement work done by the contractor, but it was not relevant whether the consumer
received any benefit from the work as the bank loaned money, not building materials. Accord-
ingly, the court erred in remanding the case to the lower court for a determination of the fair value
of the work performed.
67. Revised Regulation Z, providing guidance for the courts on the issue of repayment, states
that "[w]hen the creditor has complied. . . the consumer shall tender the money or property to
the creditor or, where the latter would be impracticable or inequitable, tender its reasonable
value." 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(d)(3) (1983).
68. See Tri-West Constr. Co. v. Hernandez, 43 Or. App. 961, -, 607 P.2d 1375, 1381 (1979)
(defendants required to tender all personalty advanced or reasonable value thereof, not including
the services furnished).
69. 649 P.2d 334 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982).
70. Id at 337.
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judgment on the promissory note for the outstanding principal plus in-
terest because the court regarded the rescission as inoperative after the
consumer failed to pay back the outstanding balance of the mortgage.
Thus, failure to pay back the outstanding balance deprived the con-
sumer of his rescission rights, and the mortgage lien continued in effect
on the property.7' Unfortunately, the court lost sight of the fact that
the statute relieved the consumer of the obligation to pay interest after
rescission.72 The court must have perceived the note as valid despite
the consumer's rescission, but once the consumer rescinds, section
125(b) of the Act triggers the obligations of the parties, and in these
circumstances a court's priority should be to obtain the creditor's funds
or other property in exchange for the removal of the lien on the con-
sumer's property. In attempting to assist the parties, the court in Hull
may have gone too far.7 3
Although the consumer can bring an action for damages within
one year of the violation, 74 he must rescind a rescindable transaction
within three business days after consummation. However, if a creditor
does not provide the required disclosures or notice of the right to re-
scind, then the right to rescind expires three years after consummation,
on transfer of the consumer's interest in the property, or on sale of the
property, whichever occurs first.75 If the consumer rescinds and the
creditor fails to initiate action to remove the lien within twenty days,
the consumer may sue for damages for the creditor's failure to follow
the rescission procedure.76
Prior to the passage of the Simplification Act, some courts believed
that they had no alternative but to give the consumer damages if the
creditor failed to take action on the consumer's rescission notice.77
Sometimes the creditor placed itself in a precarious situation by refus-
ing to cancel the lien and accept the consumer's tender of the principal
balance. Even though the refusal was made in good faith, the old lan-
71. Id
72. The consumer is not liable for "any finance or other charge." 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (1982).
73. See 13 CONSUMER CRED. & TRUTH IN LENDING COMPLIANCE REP. 5-6, Oct. 1982 (War-
ren, Gorham & Lamont, Inc.).
74. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (1982). The consumer may still assert a violation in any action by the
creditor as a matter of defense by recoupment or set-off, even though one year has expired. Id
75. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) (1982); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(3) (1983). The period may be longer if
there is intervening agency or court action. 1d ; see also FRB Official Staff Commentary Update
para. 23(a)(3), 48 Fed. Reg. 14,882, 14,889 (1983) (sale of consumer's property terminates rescis-
sion right even though consumer takes back mortgage).
76. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1982).
77. Reid v. Liberty Consumer Discount Co., 484 F. Supp. 435 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (mem.).
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guage did not seem to leave any leeway for the court to avoid the credi-
tor's forfeiture of the proceeds in the borrower's hands.78 The
creditor's misconception of a material disclosure did not absolve him of
liability.79 Thus, the consumer's tender of the proceeds triggered the
period in which the creditor was supposed to act,80 but even in that
situation, the consumer had to tender the entire amount of the loan. A
decision to tender monthly installment payments as they fell due was
not sufficient under the statute.81
C. Other Rescission Issues
Scrupulous adherence to the statute ordinarily requires the credi-
tor to return all monies that the consumer has paid in the transaction.
This seems pointless if the consumer is expected to refund the entire
proceeds of the loan to the creditor. Some courts find it permissible,
therefore, for the creditor to offset its own debt by the amount the con-
sumer owes.82 The judicial power granted under the revised statute to
modify the rescission procedure would seem to allow this kind of
setoff.83
In a credit sales transaction, the creditor would be taking a calcu-
lated risk in trying to estimate the value of improvements to the con-
sumer's property without excluding the installation cost.84 An
inaccurate estimate of the value of the property or material which has
already been installed in the consumer's property could result in a vio-
lation of the statute, thus giving the consumer additional ammunition.
It appears that the setoff procedure is useful only in the direct loan
transaction in which it is easy to compute the amount to be deducted
from the proceeds and returned by the creditor to the consumer.
Under the Simplification Act, a creditor seems to have a stronger
foundation for protecting himself in the rescission situation. If the
creditor is willing to honor the consumer's rescission by removing the
lien but the consumer does not want to return the loan proceeds to the
78. See Harris v. Tower Loan, 609 F.2d 120, 123 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 826 (1980)
(creditor loses rights in property not accepted 10 days after tender).
79. See Hamilton v. Southern Discount Co., 656 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1981) (reliance on judicial
opinions no defense).
80. Harris v. Tower Loan, 609 F.2d 120. 123 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 449 U.S. 826 (1980); Sosa
v. Fite, 498 F.2d 114, 119 (5th Cir. 1974).
81. Bustamante v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 619 F.2d 360, 365 (5th Cir. 1980).
82. Harris v. Tower Loan, 609 F.2d 120, 123 (5th Cir.), cer. denied, 449 U.S. 826 (1980);
Baker Bank & Trust Co. v. Matthews, 401 So. 2d 1246, 1252 (La. Ct. App. 1981).
83. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (1982); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(d)(4) (1983).
84. Tri-West Constr. Co. v. Hernandez, 43 Or. App. 961, 607 P.2d 1375 (1979).
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creditor, then the creditor should be willing to litigate the matter.85
The ultimate objective of the litigation should be to get the court to
exercise its powers under section 125(b) to vary the rescission proce-
dure and condition the creditor's performance on the consumer's return
of the proceeds. That action would preserve the creditor's security in-
terest, which would remain effective until the consumer's performance
of his part of the bargain. If the consumer is unable to make immedi-
ate restitution, the court could require him to continue his payments
under the original loan transaction or could set its own repayment
schedule. In any event, all payments would go to the reduction of prin-
cipal because the Simplification Act precludes the consumer's liability
for the payment of any interest or other charges. If the consumer de-
faulted under this arrangement, the creditor would then be able to fore-
close on his security interest.86
When a creditor lends money secured by a mortgage on the con-
sumer's property, the rescission normally is intended to put the parties
back in their original positions. Thus, the creditor should cancel his
lien and the consumer should return the money. However, when a
consumer gives a mortgage for a preexisting debt, rescission affects only
the security interest. The preexisting debt survives the rescission be-
cause the creditor originally granted the loan without requiring any se-
curity. Thus, the cancellation of the transaction will restore the lender
to the position of an unsecured creditor.87
If a consumer rescinds a transaction and the creditor refuses to
accept the rescission, the consumer may argue that the creditor forfeits
his right to the return of the loan proceeds. However, if the creditor is
able to show that the consumer's purported tender could not be fulfilled
because of the consumer's financial condition, then the creditor should
use the consumer's inability to make good his tender to preserve his
rights under the transaction.88 In the same vein, a bankrupt should not
85. 13 CONSUMER CRED. AND TRUTH IN LENDING COMPLIANCE REP. 5-6, Oct. 1982 (War-
ren, Gorham & Lamont, Inc.).
86. Id see also Note, Who Can Win in Truth in Lending Rescission Transactions, 43 OHIO ST.
L.J. 693, 712 (1982).
87. See Dougherty v. Hoolihan, Neils, & Boland, Ltd., 531 F. Supp. 717 (D. Minn. 1982).
88. See, e.g., Baker Bank & Trust Co. v. Matthews, 401 So. 2d 1246 (La. Ct. App. 1981). In
Baker, the court recognized the defendant debtors' right to rescind a loan agreement secured by
collateral mortgages on a car and certain real estate. The court, however, rejected the debtors'
claim that they were entitled to keep the loan proceeds because the bank had failed to take action
to terminate the security interest. The court concluded that the "'tender of loan proceeds' was but
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be able to rescind a transaction in which he is unable to comply with
the statutory requirement of returning the lender's money. 9
IV. CIVIL LIABILITY
A. Rescission and Double Recovery
Rescission of a transaction does not prevent a consumer from ob-
taining damages for the creditor's failure to comply with the statute.90
The double remedy is available when goods have been delivered or
money has been advanced under a credit arrangement.9 The result
should not be any different simply because there has been no action by
either of the parties subsequent to consummation of the credit transac-
tion. The critical period for making disclosures is before consumma-
tion of the transaction; the creditor's failure to meet that timetable
establishes his liability. It should not be relevant whether the creditor
has advanced any funds or delivered any goods under the agreement.
92
However, there is a question whether the same result should follow
when the parties to the transaction agree on a mutual rescission. If
Truth in Lending is regarded as a true disclosure law, then the decision
of the parties to rescind the transaction should have no effect on the
creditor's liability for a disclosure violation. The rescission of the
transaction ends the parties' obligations to act on the transaction but
technically has no effect on the requirement that disclosure should pre-
cede consummation of that transaction. Rescission follows consumma-
tion;93 therefore the obligation to disclose is not necessarily obviated by
the agreement to rescind.
There may be different considerations when the credit transaction
has been consummated but the consumer fails to keep his part of the
bargain. In Streit v. Fireside Chrysler-Pmouth, Inc. , there was no
doubt that the creditor and the consumer had consummated a credit
89. Pitre v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n (In re Pitre), 11 Bankr. 777 (N.D. 111. 1981).
90. Dryden v. Lou Budke's Arrow Fin. Co., 630 F.2d 641, 647 (8th Cir. 1980).
91. See, e.g., Sellers v. Wollman, 510 F.2d 119, 123 (5th Cir. 1975) (partial performance
under home improvement contract); Madewell v. Marietta Dodge, Inc., 506 F. Supp. 286 (N.D.
Ga. 1980) (exchange of money for possession of car under retail installment contract); Mitchell v.
Sec. Inv. Corp., 464 F. Supp. 650 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (payment of insurance and recording costs for
home improvement loan).
92. Burgess v. Charlottesville Say. & Loan Ass'n, 477 F.2d 40 (4th Cir. 1973) (disclosures
must precede loan closing).
93. Regulation Z defines "consummation" as "the time that a consumer becomes contractu-
ally obligated on a credit transaction." 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(13) (1983). The right to rescind,
therefore, presumes the existence of a transaction.
94. 697 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1983).
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transaction. Subsequently, the consumer did not follow through on the
underlying agreement and sued because the creditor did not provide
the necessary disclosures. The Seventh Circuit held the creditor not
liable for disclosure violations because the consumer had failed to
make the down-payment and had understated the amount of money
due on his automobile trade-in. The court emphasized the consumer's
violation of the underlying agreement,95 but the creditor was neverthe-
less delinquent in providing the necessary disclosures. The Truth in
Lending Act was designed to give a consumer access to credit informa-
tion before consummation of a transaction.96 The creditor's obligation
to disclose does not depend on whether the consumer fulfills his part of
the bargain; the disclosure must precede any contractual undertaking.
It should not be relevant that Mr. Streit did not shop around or that he
was fully informed about the credit transaction.9 If the bank was ag-
grieved by the consumer's failure to act pursuant to the agreement,
then it should have pursued its remedies under the terms of that agree-
ment. Liability under Truth in Lending is a different question. The
consumer has a right to sue for violations of the Act, and the creditor
should not be given the upper hand under circumstances which do not
relate to his prior disclosure obligations.
The court seemed heartened by the failure of the Sixth Circuit in
Davis v. Werne9 s to impose liability on a creditor when the parties did
not take any further action after consummation of the transaction.
However, in Davis the parties had agreed to rescind the transaction. If
a consumer prevails on a creditor to terminate the transaction because
the consumer is overextended, the creditor's failure to provide the nec-
essary disclosure may have been a significant factor in the creation of
the consumer's financial dilemma. The creditor's liability for not dis-
closing should not depend on his liability on the underlying contract.
Therefore, there is little basis for suggesting that some action must be
taken subsequent to the consummation of the transaction for the disclo-
sure obligation to apply.
95. Id at 197.
96. Anderson Bros. Ford v. Valencia, 452 U.S. 205, 219-20 (1981).
97. The court said that the Act was intended to encourage consumers to look around for the
best credit terms. 697 F.2d at 197 (citing Anderson Bros. Ford, 452 U.S. at 219-20). The court
excused the creditor from liability in Streit, finding that the purposes of the Act were served when
the consumer understood the terms of the agreement. 697 F.2d at 197; cf Zamarippa v. Cy's Car
Sales, Inc., 674 F.2d 877 (1lth Cir. 1982) (disclosure requirements under Truth in Lending not
determined by consumers' ability to understand English).
98. Mutual rescission occurred when the creditor informed the consumer that the assignee-
finance company never purchased the contract. 697 F.2d at 196.
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The court in Streit seemed convinced that there was no congres-
sional intent to impose liability in a situation in which consumer de-
fault precluded implementation of the transaction.99 It appears that the
court may have confused actions effectuating consummation of the
transaction with actions taken subsequent to consummation. There is
no provision in Truth in Lending that requires the consumer to do any-
thing to perpetuate the agreement. The creditor's contractual remedy
should not affect his Truth in Lending liability.
B. Releases
Adventurous creditors may seek to protect themselves from Truth
in Lending actions by obtaining a release from consumers for any vio-
lations. Allowing creditors to obtain general releases from consumers
presents a question of public policy about the goals of Truth in Lend-
ing. Such releases might deprive consumers of their bargaining power
and nullify congressional attempts to provide meaningful information
in this area. On the other hand, other considerations are involved if the
release of the Truth in Lending claim is part of a general settlement. It
depends, of course, upon whether the settlement concerns only the
credit transaction or whether it also involves the creditor's disclosure
obligation. In Parker v. DeKalb Chrysler-Plymouth, 'I the consumer
signed a document releasing a dealer from any claim arising out of an
automobile purchase.' 0 ' However, the dealer never gave the consumer
a disclosure statement and the consumer did not even know that she
had a Truth in Lending claim when she signed the release. This cir-
cumstance raised a question in the court's mind as to whether the con-
sumer intended to release her claim when in fact she had complained
about a mechanical defect in the automobile. 102 It was the Eleventh
99. 697 F.2d at 197. The court stated as follows:
[O]ur holding is based on our opinion that it is not good policy and is not required by a
reasonable construction of the Act to hold a creditor liable for a technical violation of the
sort here involved: where the consumer was not misled nor financially harmed and
where the consumer unilaterally breached the contract almost immediately after it was
entered.
Id
100. 673 F.2d 1178 (1lth Cir. 1982).
101. The release read as follows:
For and in consideration of $500.00, I, Marlene V. Parker, hereby release and forever
discharge DeKalb Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., its agents and employees, from any and all
claims from the beginning of the world to the date of these presents including but not
limited to any claim I may have of any kind arising out of my purchase of a 1977
Chrysler Cordoba. ...
673 F.2d at 1179.
102. Id at 1182.
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Circuit's view that a release affecting the consumer's Truth in Lending
remedies must be specific enough to become part of the settlement
agreement and that general language cannot rob the consumer of her
statutory claim.
°3
Although the court was unwilling to reject all releases of Truth in
Lending claims,'0 4 it was unmoved by the sweeping language of the
document in Parker. The dealer saw the issue as one involving the
intent of the parties at the time the release was signed. The court did
not see intent as a relevant consideration unless it could ascertain that
the release might conceivably include Truth in Lending claims. How-
ever, the court subsequently held that the consumer "was unaware that
the release encompassed her TILA rights."1 5 Surely this was an as-
sessment of her intent; therefore, it seems questionable for the court to
disavow the relevance of the consumer's intent on one hand, while ad-
verting to the consumer's unawareness on the other.
Although the court alleged substantial reliance on the public pol-
icy aspects of Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil, 1°6 in which the
Supreme Court frowned upon the release of an employee's rights to
overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the court
was more concerned with the consumer's waiver of her rights through
use of the language "any and all claims."' °7 Had the dealer made the
appropriate disclosure, he might have had a more convincing argument
that the waiver encompassed all claims, including those based on dis-
closure violations. The consumer's ignorance of her rights would have
been less pertinent under those circumstances. However, because the
consumer was unaware of her rights under the Act and may have been
unaware of the Act itself, the release of "any and all claims" could have
103. Id; see also Standish v. Hub Motor Co., 149 Ga. App. 365, 254 S.E.2d 416 (1979). In
Standish, the consumer filed suit in federal district court, alleging Truth in Lending violations.
She subsequently agreed to settle, signing a release which covered all claims "arising out of any
alleged violation of the 'Truth in Lending Act.'" 149 Ga. App. at 365, 254 S.E.2d at 417. There-
after, the plaintiff sued in state court for violations of state law. The state court rejected the
creditor's defense of res judicata, holding that the release was limited to the Truth in Lending
claims, and that the dismissal of federal claims did not operate as an adjudication of the claims
presented under state law. Id
104. 673 F.2d at 1182.
105. Id
106. 324 U.S. 697 (1945). In Brooklyn Savings the Supreme Court, holding that the release of
an employee's rights to overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act was void as
against public policy, stated that: "Where a private right is granted in the public interest to effec-
tuate a legislative policy, waiver of a right so charged or colored with the public interest will not
be allowed where it would thwart the legislative policy which it was designed to effectuate." Id at
704 (footnote omitted).
107. 673 F.2d at 1182.
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applied only to claims affecting the automobile.' Even in Brooklyn
Savings the Court reserved decision concerning releases given in situa-
tions involving a genuine dispute between the parties and culminating
in a compromise.'0 9 There was no blanket rejection of releases under
the Fair Labor Standards Act; the Court in Brooklyn Savings simply
thought that public policy prohibited a waiver of an employee's right to
liquidated damages under that act.' " 0
Since the court in Parker did not hold all releases void under the
Act, thereby disagreeing with Buford v. American Finance Co., "' one is
left to speculate as to the court's reaction if the consumer had signed
her release after receiving a defective disclosure statement. It can be
argued that public policy considerations require an absolute ban on
releases under the Act. The Act is intended to ensure that creditors
give consumers meaningful disclosures of credit costs. The civil rem-
edy providing a minimum recovery to consumers is obviously meant to
be a strong deterrent to uncooperative creditors,"12 but there may be a
significant difference between the sufficiency of disclosures and the
non-existence of disclosures. If a creditor and a consumer are quarrel-
ling over the language of a particular item on a disclosure form, it can
be argued that settling the issue will not necessarily compromise public
policy. But if a creditor makes no disclosures, the deterrent effect of the
statute might be compromised through an attempted waiver. There
may be other situations in which there is substantial compliance even
though the creditor does not follow the exact language of the Act.' 's
An aggressive consumer may view the creditor's obligation as one of
very strict compliance without any room for minor deviations)1 4 This
108. The court also recognized that enforcement efforts rely essentially on individual consum-
ers who act as private attorneys general. Therefore, allowing a waiver in a case such as Parker
would hamper enforcement efforts as well as thwart public interest in determining inconsistent
lending practices. Id at 1181.
109. 324 U.S. at 714.
110. Id at 707.
111. 333 F. Supp. 1243 (N.D. Ga. 1971). The Buford court held that releases obtained after
commencement of Truth in Lending actions in federal court were null and void.
112. See Smith v. Chapman, 614 F.2d 968, 971 (5th Cir. 1980) (remedy under the Act designed
to deter illegalities as well as compensate consumers for actual injuries); see also Dzadovsky v.
Lyons Ford Sales, Inc., 593 F.2d 538 (3rd Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (in light of Act's purpose to
inform consumers, plaintiff need not allege financial injury to recover for alleged disclosure
violations).
113. The court in Smith v. Chapman said: "Strict compliance does not necessarily mean punc-
tilious compliance if, with minor deviations from the language described in the Act, there is still a
substantial, clear disclosure of the fact or information demanded by the applicable statute or regu-
lation." 614 F.2d at 972.
114. The Simplification Act amended § 130(a) of the Truth in Lending Act by allowing civil
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could give rise to a bona fide dispute between the parties. Working out
an effective compromise under these circumstances would clearly not
violate the public policy embodied in the Act.
V. ATTORNEY'S FEES
A. Settlements
When a consumer is successful in a Truth in Lending action, he is
entitled to recover a reasonable attorney's fee." 5 If the consumer and
the creditor settle the suit before trial, thus avoiding any judicial find-
ing of a violation, a question arises whether this is a "successful action"
giving rise to the consumer's right to an attorney's fee. The Fifth Cir-
cuit feels that if the creditor settles the action only to avoid the incon-
venience of an unfounded suit, then the suit is not really a successful
one in the statutory sense." 6 On the other hand, if the suit is meritori-
ous, then there is no question of liability-only one of damages. An
attorney's fee should not be awarded if the consumer waives his right to
the fee as a part of the settlement," 7 but if the court does not set the
attorney's fee, there may be some question whether the attorney can
bring his own action to recover payment. Arguably, the Act grants the
consumer, not the attorney, the right to insist on an attorney's fee. The
Eleventh Circuit, however, in James v. Home Construction Co.,"'8
found no difficulty in providing a remedy to an attorney whose fee was
omitted from the settlement. The court held that the lawyer's right to
bring a direct action for his fee was implied in the statutory framework
which allowed the consumer to sue the creditor, 19 and that it would be
contrary to the intent of Congress to deprive attorneys of their statutory
rights in the event of a successful suit simply because the court had
neglected to fix the fee when the lawsuit was settled. 120
penalties only if a creditor fails to follow the rescission requirements or to give certain designated
disclosures which may be regarded as material. See Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 615(b)(2), 94 Stat. 168,
181 (1980) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1982)). The amendment to § 130(a) was intended to
deal with the problem of minor errors which do not affect the consumer's ability to determine the
most favorable terms.
115. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3) (1982).
116. Gram v. Bank of La., 691 F.2d 728, 730 (5th Cir. 1982) (dicta).
117. Id
118. 689 F.2d 1357 (11th Cir. 1982).








There is also a question whether an attorney's fee should be
awarded to a consumer for defending a creditor's counterclaim. The
statutory criterion is whether the attorney's fee for defending the coun-
terclaim can be interpreted as part of a successful action to enforce the
creditor's liability under the Act. 1 ' InLacy v. GeneralFinance Corp. 122
the Fifth Circuit did not award an attorney's fee to the plaintiffs for
defending against the creditor's counterclaim because it felt that such a
defense was not the same as enforcing liability under the Act. The
court's decision in Lacy was followed in McDonald v. Credit Thrift of
America, Inc. 11 But in McDonald24 Judge Clark distinguished Lacy
in his dissent because the plaintiff in Lacy lost on the creditor's coun-
terclaim whereas in McDonald the plaintiff won. His point was that the
successful defense of a counterclaim should be regarded as part of the
"successful action to enforce" liability under the Act, 12 and that failure
to compensate the plaintiff in the Truth in Lending action for defend-
ing against the creditor's counterclaim might discourage plaintiffs from
bringing meritorious claims if there is a possibility that there will be no
attorney's fee for defending the counterclaim. Judge Clark supported a
rule which would allow the plaintiff to recover an attorney's fee in suc-
cessfully defending a creditor's counterclaim, discouraging lenders
from raising frivolous issues to thwart the enforcement of Truth in
Lending.
The general rule, of course, is that a prevailing party may not re-
cover attorney's fees. 126 Congress has created specific statutory excep-
tions to this rule to allow recovery of fees where necessary to protect
121. The current provision for an attorney's fee, § 130(a) of the Act, provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, any creditor who fails to comply with
any requirement imposed under this part, including any requirement under section 1635
of this title.., is liable to such person in an amount equal to the sum of-
(3) in the case of any successful action to enforce the foregoing liability or in any
action in which a person is determined to have a right of rescission under section 1635 of
this title, the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney's fee as determined
by the court.
15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1982).
122. 651 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1981).
123. 661 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
124. Id. at 70.
125. Id (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3) (1982)).
126. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soe'y, 421 U.S. 240, 271 (1975) (denying fee
award in action under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1982), and National
Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321-95 (1982)).
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important federal interests,127 such as encouraging consumers to vindi-
cate their rights under the Act.'28 The Act awards an attorney's fee
incurred in prosecuting a successful claim;129 it does not provide such a
fee for parties to any other claim or controversy. 130 Accordingly, when
a creditor brings a compulsory counterclaim against the consumer for
default in the credit transaction, the consumer is not entitled to an at-
torney's fee for defending the counterclaim.' 3 1
This distinction conforms with the underlying purpose of the stat-
ute, which is to provide liability for a creditor's failure to disclose cer-
tain terms in a consumer credit transaction. Liability under the statute
bears no relation to the consumer's liability on the outstanding debt,
and the consumer's claim under the Act may be won or lost regardless
of the merits of a creditor's claim for the outstanding debt.' 32
In a Truth in Lending action, an attorney's fee is not subject to
setoff against the consumer's outstanding debt to the creditor, 33 and
thus, the consumer cannot deny the attorney his fees on the theory that
the statute provides that the money be paid to the consumer. The Fifth
Circuit has held that the "mechanics of payment" lie within a trial
court's jurisdiction and that a trial court can authorize payment directly
to the attorney or to the attorney and the consumer jointly. 34 But the
attorney cannot carry forward the litigation on appeal if the client has
settled the matter, inasmuch as a contingent fee arrangement does not
invest an attorney with an independent, recognizable interest under the
statute.
35
C. Who Can Recover Attorney's Fees
If a consumer comes into court on his own behalf, he cannot re-
cover the statutory allowance for an attorney's fee, since the purpose of
the Act is to encourage private enforcement of its provisions by permit-
127. 421 U.S. at 260 & n.33.
128. See Thomas v. Myers-Dickson Furniture Co., 479 F.2d 740, 748 (5th Cir. 1973) (goal of
statute is to create system of "private attorney generals" to enforce Act).
129. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3) (1982).
130. Lacy v. General Fin. Corp., 651 F.2d at 1029.
131. McDonald v. Credithrift of Am., 661 F.2d 69, 70 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam); Lacy v.
General Fin. Corp., 651 F.2d 1026, 1029 (5th Cir. 1981).
132. Lacy v. General Fin. Corp., 651 F.2d at 1029. But see McDonald v. Credithrift of Am.,
661 F.2d at 70 (Clark, J., dissenting) (consumer who defeats counterclaim entitled to fee award).
133. Plant v. Blazer Fin. Serv. Inc., 598 F.2d 1357 (5th Cir. 1979); Graham v. Bank of Damas-
cus, 528 F. Supp. 596, 597-98 (W.D. Va. 1981); Allied Fin. Co. v. Garza, 626 S.W.2d 120, 124
(Tex. Civ. App. 1981).
134. Plant v. Blazer Fin. Serv. Inc., 598 F.2d at 1366.
135. See Smith v. South Side Loan Co., 567 F.2d 306, 307 (5th Cir. 1978).
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ting the litigant to obtain legal services.' 3 6 The Fourth Circuit, in White
v. Arlen Realty and Development Corp. ,137 did not award an attorney a
statutory fee for representing himself. The court thought that the pur-
poses of the Act would be best served by awarding fees to attorneys
who represent plaintiffs other than themselves and that effective legal
representation depends not only on legal expertise "but also on de-
tached and objective perspective."'' 3 8
That does not mean that a consumer must have a legal obligation
to pay his attorney in order for a court to award an attorney's fee. An
attorney's fee is available to Legal Aid attorneys who defend consum-
ers without charge. 139 In such a case, the fee which is awarded is nor-
mally paid directly to the Legal Aid organization in furtherance of the
purposes of private enforcement under the Act.
D. Setoffs
There is an additional consideration if a state statute allows a cred-
itor to recover an attorney's fee when he prevails in a suit against the
consumer on the underlying transaction. In Hines v. Good Housekeep-
ing Shop 140 a creditor was allowed to offset the debtor's recovery of an
attorney's fee under Truth in Lending against his own award of an at-
torney's fee from the contractual claim. The Georgia Court of Appeals
distinguished Plant v. Blazer Financial Services on the grounds that the
setoff prohibited in Plant pitted attorney's fees awarded in Truth in
Lending against the consumer's outstanding debt to the creditor.14'
That may be a viable distinction, especially since the attorney's fees
awarded to the creditor in Hines were based on a state statute authoriz-
ing such fees for a party's "bad faith, stubborn litigiousness, or unnec-
essary trouble and expense."1 42 It seems, therefore, that this setoff was
rooted in the public policy of the two statutes involved and that the
state interest in deterring groundless litigation was just as strong as the
federal interest in ensuring meaningful credit disclosure.
136. Hannon v. Security Nat'l Bank, 537 F.2d 327, 328 (9th Cir. 1976).
137. White v. Arlen Realty & Dev. Corp., 614 F.2d 387, 388 (4th Cir.) cert. denied, 447 U.S.
923 (1980).
138. Id at 388.
139. Kessler v. Associates Fin. Serv. Co., 639 F.2d 498 (9th Cir. 1981); Manning v. Princeton
Consumer Discount Co., 533 F.2d 102, 106 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 865 (1976); Sellers v.
Wollman, 510 F.2d 119, 123 (5th Cir. 1975) (fee allowed to Legal Aid lawyer).
140. 161 Ga. App. 318, 291 S.E.2d 238 (1982).
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Having granted the setoff of one party's fees against the other, the
Hines court still had to face the issue raised in Plant, since the attor-
ney's fee for the consumer was slightly larger than that for the creditor.
The issue then became whether this excess could be set off against the
amount owed by the consumer on the underlying debt. The court held
that it could, but viewed the award of an attorney's fee as "the right of
the party suing not the attorney representing him."'43 The court's reli-
ance on that characterization, originally made in Smith v. South Side
Loan Co., 4 may have been misplaced. The question in Smith was
whether an attorney should be allowed to proceed with Truth in Lend-
ing litigation on appeal after his client had settled the matter.' 45 It
would have been pointless to allow the attorney to proceed when he
had no client after settlement. It would be more appropriate to say that
the right to bring the action resides in the consumer, but that once the
action is successful, then the award of fees is the attorney's and not the
consumer's. 146 If the attorney's award is subject to setoff, the congres-
sional purposes in enacting Truth in Lending would be thwarted.1 47 In
many cases the setoff might reduce the award so much that it would not
be worthwhile for the attorney to pursue his client's legal remedy. The
better approach, therefore, is to insulate the attorney's award from the
underlying controversy so as, to ensure that a consumer would have no
hesitation in seeking representation in his legal skirmish with the
creditor.
E. Attorney's Fees in Rescission Actions
Another question is whether a consumer can recover an attorney's
fee in an action for rescission. The original section 130(a) apparently
did not allow for that possibility. The "reasonable attorney's fee" was
available only in a successful action to enforce the creditor's liability
for failing to disclose the appropriate information.
148
143. Id at 324, 291 S.E.2d at 244 (quoting Smith v. South Side Loan Co., 567 F.2d 306, 307
(5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam)).
144. Smith v. South Side Loan Co., 567 F.2d 306, 307 (5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam).
145. Id
146. See Allied Finance Co. v. Garza, 626 S.W.2d 120, 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981) (award of
fees is property of attorney).
147. James v. Home Constr. Co., 689 F.2d 1357, 1359 (11th Cir. 1982); Plant v. Blazer Fin.
Serv., Inc., 598 F.2d 1357, 1366 (5th Cir. 1979).
148. Section 130(a) originally provided as follows:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, any creditor who fails in connection
with any consumer credit transaction to disclose to any person any information required
under this part to be disclosed to that person is liable to that person in an amount equal
1983]
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It was this version of the statute that confronted the Fifth Circuit
in Sosa v. Fie.'49 The court applied principles of statutory construc-
tion that ordinarily would foreclose the application of the provision for
civil liability under these circumstances. 50 While section 130(a) did
recognize the appropriateness of a fee in any action by the consumer to
recover a civil penalty for the creditor's failure to disclose, there was no
comparable language concerning the consumer's rights in a rescission
action. While this statutory silence could mean that Congress did not
intend to award an attorney's fee for rescission, the court was not de-
terred by this missing language. It saw a rescission action as a vehicle
for vindicating congressional policy in the Truth in Lending area and
used its discretion to award an attorney's fee.'
The Fifth Circuit was not at all surprised that the rescission provi-
sion did not deal with the question of an attorney's fee. It read the
section as self-implementing; that is, the section provided "legal reme-
dies which have binding legal effect absent any court action."' 52 But
since Congress must have realized that there would be times when a
creditor would not take the necessary steps to reflect the termination of
a security interest in a consumer's property, 53 there was no justification
for assuming that the enforcement of civil penalties would bring more
litigation than that of rescission. The rescission section does make the
security interest void once a consumer rescinds, 54 but it also requires
the creditor and the consumer to take certain actions to complete the
process. Those actions must be enforced in court when the parties do
not follow the statutory requirements.
In 1974, section 130(a) was amended. The new language imposed
to the sum of (1) twice the amount of the finance charge in connection with the transac-
tion, except that the liability under this paragraph shall not be less than $100 nor greater
than $1,000; and (2) in the case of any successful action to enforce the foregoing liability,
the costs of the action together with a reasonable attorney's fee as determined by the
court.
Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, § 130(a), 82 Stat. 146, 157 (1968) (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1982)).
149. 498 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1974).
150. Id at 121. The principle is expresslo un/us est exclusio alterius. If something is specifi-
cally covered in a statute, then anything missing was not intended to be covered. See 2A C.
SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.23 (4th ed. 1973 & Supp. 1983).
151. 498 F.2d at 121.
152. Id at 121-22.
153. Section 125 of the Act provides the procedure to be followed in effectuating rescis-
sion. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (1982). Accordingly, to the extent that the creditor complies
with the procedure, the statute is self-implementing. On the other hand, the creditor's
noncompliance forces the consumer to seek judicial intervention to enforce his rights
under the statute.
154. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b) (1982).
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liability not when the creditor failed to "disclose. . . any information
required" but when the creditor failed "to comply with any require-
ment" imposed by certain sections of the Act, including section 125.155
That broader liability was imposed in Gerasta v. Hibernia National
Bank.'56 In that case the creditor did not respond to the debtor's at-
tempts to rescind the transaction and thus did not comply with the re-
quirements of section 125,111 leaving the consumer to seek his remedy
in court. There was no doubt about the validity of the consumer's re-
scission, yet the bank did not act because of some uncertainty about the
consumer's rights. The statute, however, required the bank to take the
appropriate steps for terminating its security interest, and the bank
therefore failed to comply with a requirement of the Act.'5 8
When section 130 of the Act was amended again in 1980, it left no
doubt that an attorney's fee would be granted in an action for rescis-
sion. 59 The statute160 now gives explicit support to the interpretation
of the Gerasta court' 6 1 and lays to rest any doubts about the propriety
of awarding an attorney's fee in a rescission action.
155. Act of Oct. 28, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-495, § 408(a), 88 Stat. 1511, 1518 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1982)).
156. 575 F.2d 580, 583 (5th Cir. 1978). See also James v. Home Constr. Co., 689 F.2d 1357,
1358 (1 1th Cir. 1982) (attorney may recover fee in rescission action).
157. Under § 130 the creditor's failure to comply with any requirement imposed by chapter 2,
4 or 5 of Title 1 of the Act exposed him to liability for the attorney's fees in a successful consumer
action. Act of Oct. 28, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-495, § 408(a), 88 Stat. 1511, 1518 (amended 1980). In
Rachbach v. Cogswell, 547 F.2d 502, 506 (10th Cir. 1977), the court denied attorney's fees in a
rescission action on the authority of Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soe'y, 421 U.S. 240
(1975). In Strader v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 191 Colo. 206, 551 P.2d 720 (1976), the court allowed
attorney's fees because the Uniform Consumer Credit Code authorized such fees "as determined
by the court." 191 Colo. at 211-212, 551 P.2d at 723-24 (citing CoLo. REv. STAT. § 5-5-203(1)(b)
(1973)).
158. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1976).
159. Effective October 1, 1982, § 130(a) reads in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, any creditor who fails to comply with any
requirement imposed under this chapter including any requirement under section 125, or
chapter 4 or 5 of this title with respect to any person is liable to such person in -an amount
equal to the sum of -
(3) in the ease of any successful action to enforce the foregoing liability or in any
action in which a person is determined to have right of rescission under section 125, the
costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney's fee as determined by the court.
Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 96-221, tit. VI, § 615(a), 94 Stat.
168, 180 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1982)).
160. The Senate Report stated the following about the amendment: "The bill also makes
explicit that a consumer may institute suit under section 130 to enforce the right of rescission and
recover costs and attorney's fees in a successful action." S. Rep. No. 368, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 32,
reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 236, 268.
161. 575 F.2d at 584.
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VI. CREDITORS AND ASSIGNEES
A. Judicial Interpretations
Until recently, it was fairly well settled that a retailer who
promptly assigned a credit contract to a finance company was not the
one extending credit. The courts looked at the reality of the situation
and held that the finance company was the creditor and the retailer
merely an arranger of credit.' 62 Courts viewed the retailer as an ar-
ranger because he assigned the credit contract to the assignee as soon as
the transaction was completed and it was generally acknowledged that
the retailer fully expected the assignee-lender to pay him out
promptly. 63 But even though an arranger was still classified as a credi-
tor and the disclosure statement had to identify both the retailer and
the assignee' 64 as creditors, this did not mean that the word "creditor"
had to be used for the assignee. It was sufficient if the statement ex-
plained the role of the assignee-lender in the transaction and informed
the consumer about the assignment.1 65
B. Statutory Changes
The Simplification Act addressed the plight of assignees and took
them out of the definition of "creditor."'166 The retailer was regarded as
the creditor and was therefore expected to make the necessary disclo-
sures. An assignee-lender who actually lent the money was not a credi-
tor because the installment contract did not identify him as the one to
whom the debt was initially payable. The retailer was identified as the
creditor because he arranged for the credit to be given by the assignee-
finance company. In 1982, the definition of "creditor" was further
amended by excluding arrangers. 67 A creditor is now one who regu-
162. See Meyers v. Clearview Dodge Sales Inc., 539 F.2d 511, 515 (5th Cir. 1976) (automobile
retailer is arranger of credit), ceri. denied, 431 U.S. 929 (1977); Joseph v. Norman's Health Club,
Inc., 532 F.2d 86 (8th Cir. 1976) (health club is arranger of credit). The Act originally defined
creditors as those who "regularly extend or arrange for the extension of credit .... 15 U.S.C.
§ 1602(0 (1976). See also Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(s) (1976) (creditor is anyone who in the
ordinary course of business regularly extends credit).
163. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Cenance, 452 U.S. 155, 158 (1981) (per curiam); Meyers v.
Clearview Dodge, 539 F.2d 511, 515-16 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 929 (1977).
164. An assignee can avoid liability if the disclosure is not apparent on the face of the instru-
ment. 15 U.S.C. § 1641(a) (1982).
165. Boncyk v. Cavanaugh Motors, 673 F.2d 256, 260 (9th Cir. 1981).
166. Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 602(a), 94 Stat. 134, 168 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1602(t)
(1982).
167. Garn-St. Germain Depository Institution Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 702, 96 Stat.
1469, 1538, (amending § 103(0 of the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1602(f) (1982)).
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larly extends credit, but the debt must be initially payable to him.'68
The dilemma posed by characterizing a retailer as an arranger is
apparent. If one follows the judicial approach to the retailer-assignee
relationship, then under the amended definition there is no creditor in
this kind of transaction. If the retailer is only an arranger, he is not
extending credit. Even if the assignee is extending credit, he is still not
a creditor because the debt is not initially payable to him. This means
that neither party is responsible for making disclosures.
The opinion of the Federal Reserve Board Staff'6 9 differs from
that of the courts. The Staff view is that the retailer is in fact a creditor
because he extends credit and the debt is initially payable to him. Thus
the retailer must make the disclosures required by the Act. Under this
view an assignee is not a creditor because the debt is not initially paya-
ble to him, but an assignee is still liable for any disclosure violations
apparent on the face of the instrument. 70
Although the Board's position seems to impose a new obligation
on the retailer to make disclosures, that apparent responsibility actually
flows from the new definition of "creditor." Inasmuch as the Simplifi-
cation Act does not include arrangers in the definition of creditor a
retailer must be classified as a creditor and the disclosure obligation
applies to him. Otherwise, in the retailer-assignee situation, no one
would have that obligation. The courts will have to accustom them-
selves to the idea that a retailer is in fact extending credit at the time of
the credit transaction even though the assignment to the finance com-
pany is made immediately.
Arrangers of credit were removed from coverage under the Act
because Congress wanted to insulate real estate brokers from liabil-
ity.' 7' However, in making such a sweeping change, Congress has in
fact created confusion about the responsibility for making disclosures.
168. Id
169. FRB Official Staff Interpretations para. 2(a)(17)(ii), 12 C.F.R. Supp. I at 670 (1983).
170. 15 U.S.C. § 1641(a) (1982).
171. The Senate Report explained the amendment this way:
When the Truth in Lending Act was amended in 1980, the definition of "creditor"
was altered in order to eliminate confusion in "multiple creditor" situations. However,
as a result of that change, the Act for the first time appeared to impose disclosure respon-
sibilities on those who arrange for credit extensions, whether or not there is a person who
regularly extends credit participating in the transaction. Since the coverage of real estate
brokers was clearly not the focus of the Committee when it began the task of simplifying
the law in 1977, nor when it redefined "creditor", it is time the Congress indicates its
intent with respect to the coverage of such individuals.
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The original 1980 amendment to the Truth in Lending Act was in-
tended to clarify the responsibility for disclosure where there was more
than one creditor. 172 The unhappy result was that arrangers of credit
were saddled with the duty of disclosure, even though the person ex-
tending credit may not have been in the lending business. The elimina-
tion of arrangers of credit from the definition was intended to ensure
that coverage would be restricted to those who were in the business of
extending credit."17 It remains to be seen whether there will be further
action to resolve the doubts that have arisen as a result of the latest
congressional action.' 74
VII. DOUBLE RECOVERY
Prior to the passage of the Simplification Act, the circuits dis-
agreed whether each obligor in a transaction could recover the statu-
tory penalty for a creditor's violation of the Act. The Fifth Circuit
t75
and the Seventh Circuit 7 6 came out in favor of a separate recovery for
each obligor. Section 130(a) of the Act caused the confusion, providing
that any creditor who violated the Act with respect to any person would
be liable to that person. 77 The question was whether the language in
the House Report prescribing a maximum penalty of $1,000 in any "in-
dividual credit transaction" limited the recovery so that regardless of
the number of obligors, the maximum amount would always be the
same.
Those courts which have supported recovery for each obligor have
172. Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 602(a), 94 Stat.
168 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1602(f) (1982)).
173. The summary of the bill shed this light on the amended definition of creditor:
Section 702: Definition of creditor
This section amends the definition of "creditor" in the Truth in Lending Act to
exclude "arrangers of credit", so that in other than open end credit transactions, the Act
will apply only to professional extenders of consumer credit, namely, those who regu-
larly extend consumer credit.
S. REP. No. 536, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 71 (1982), reprintedin 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
3054, 3125.
174. Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 702(a), 96
Stat. 1469, 1538 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1602(f) (1982).
175. Davis v. United Cos. Mortgage & Inv., 551 F.2d 971, 973 (5th Cir. 1977).
176. Mirabal v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 537 F.2d 871, 883 (7th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978).
177. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1976). The legislative history added to the confusion because of the
language of the House Report which read as follows: "Any creditor failing to disclose required
information would be subject to a civil suit with a penalty equal to twice the finance charge, with a
minimum penalty of $100 and a maximum penalty not to exceed $1,000 on any individual credit
transaction." H.R. REP. No. 1040,90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967)reprintedin 1968 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 1962, 1976.
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concentrated on the statutory language imposing liability with respect
to "any person." The creditor's failure to comply with the statutory
requirements makes him liable to that person in the statutory amount.
Some courts have argued that disclosure must be made to all obligors
and that failure to do so creates liability with respect to any one of
them."' It has also been suggested that when a creditor bargains for
more than one signatory on a loan, he assumes disclosure liability with
respect to each person who has promised to repay the debt. The credi-
tor gets the additional security provided by another obligor, but he also
is responsible for making the appropriate disclosures to that other per-
son. 179 Others have argued that disclosure liability was not weakened
by a provision which allowed the creditor to provide a "statement of
information" to one obligor only.'80 It was assumed that each obligor
would still have an opportunity to look at the disclosure statement
before deciding on the best available credit terms and that the discre-
tion allowed in the statute to provide a single statement did not detract
from the remedy available to other obligors who were misled by faulty
disclosure. '8'
The Fourth,' 2 Ninth,8 3 and Tenth 8 4 Circuits did not allow mul-
tiple recoveries for joint obligors. For example, the Fourth Circuit in
178. Davis v. United Cos. Mortgage & Inv., 551 F.2d 971, 972 (5th Cir. 1977); Mirabal v.
General Motors Acceptance Corp., 537 F.2d 871, 883 (7th Cir. 1976) cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039
(1978); Allen v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 531 F.2d 797, 806 (7th Cir. 1976).
179. Andersen v. Farmers Bank, 640 F.2d 1347, 1349 (8th Cir. 1981) (per curiam); Cadmus v.
Commercial Credit Plan, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 1018, 1022 (D. Del. 1977); Rivers v. Southern Dis-
count Co. (N.D. Ga. 1973), [1974-80 Transfer Binder] CONSUMER CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 98, 796.
See also White v. World Fin., 653 F.2d 147, 152 (5th Cir. 1981) (double recovery for joint obli-
gors). But see In re Wilson, 411 F. Supp. 751, 753 (S.D. Ohio 1975) (husband and wife entitled to
one recovery where they enter into credit transaction as a "family unit"); St. Marie v. Southland
Mobile Homes, Inc., 376 F. Supp. 996, 996-97 (E.D. La. 1974) (same).
180. Mirabal v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 537 F.2d at 882-83.
181. Allen v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 531 F.2d 797, 805 (7th Cir. 1976); Sutliffv. County Sav. &
Loan Co., 533 F. Supp. 1307, 1313 (N.D. Ohio 1982). But see Vines v. Hodges, 422 F. Supp. 1292,
1301 (D.D.C. 1976) (Single recovery allowed because Regulation Z requires that disclosures be
made to only one of several purchasers). The provision allowing disclosures through a single
statement seemed to be motivated by congressional interests in avoiding unnecessary documenta-
tion. The House Report made this point: "In order to reduce needless paper work, disclosure
need only be made to one obligor. For example, if two people (e.g. a husband and wife) are the
obligors, only one copy of the contract with the required disclosure information would need to be
furnished." H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 1962, 1984.
182. Mason v. General Fin. Corp., 542 F.2d 1226 (4th Cir. 1976).
183. Riggs v. Government Employees Fin. Corp., 623 F.2d 68, 75 (9th Cir. 1980); Milhollin v.
Ford Motor Credit Co., 588 F.2d 753, 758 (9th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 444 U.S. 555
(1980).
184. Hinkle v. Rock Springs Nat'l Bank, 538 F.2d 295 (10th Cir. 1976).
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Power v. Sims and Levin'85 agreed that the creditor was obligated to
make disclosures to both consumers because the transaction was
rescindable, but interpreted the legislative history to mean that there
could only be a single recovery. The court held that the contract was
one credit transaction and that the statutory maximum applied to each
credit transaction. Since there was only a single credit transaction in-
volving the joint obligors, there could be only a single recovery.'86
The Simplification Act limits recovery for joint obligors to the
$1,000 maximum set out in the statute,18 7 resolving the question for
transactions arising subsequent to the effective date of that Act.'88
However, courts are still presented with cases under the old statute,
which had no specific language dealing with the problem. Recently, in
Brown v. Marquette Savings and Loan Association, 89 the Seventh Cir-
cuit reexamined its previous position in light of the new language in the
Simplification Act. While the transaction under review predated the
new statute, the court looked to the amendment to determine whether
Congress intended to change, or to clarify, the existing law. This was
an opportunity for the court to decide on the effect of this subsequent
legislation which, although clarifying the situation for subsequent
cases, led to further inquiry about the meaning of the previous version.
There seemed to be no legislative history explaining the rationale for
the change and therefore the court had to resort to general principles of
statutory construction to determine the effect of the new language.
One principle suggests that where there is a dispute among the
courts, a statutory amendment is intended "to clarify, rather than
change, the existing law."' 90 Since the court could find no evidence in
the legislative history that Congress intended to change the law in the
area of dispute, it decided that the amendment was simply a point of
clarification, indicating once and for all the original congressional in-
185. 542 F.2d 1216, 1219-20 (4th Cir. 1976).
186. Id; Milhollin v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 588 F.2d at 758.
187. Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 615(a)(3), 94 Stat. 168, 180 (1980) (current version at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1640(a) (1982)).
188. The Act took effect on October 1, 1982, Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 625(a) 94 Stat. 168, 185, but
there may still be some decisions in the judicial pipeline which will be affected by the old version.
Compare White v. World Fin., 653 F.2d 147, 152 (5th Cir. 1981) (allowing double recovery with-
out considering the impact of the 1980 amendment to the Act) and Andersen v. Farmers Bank,
640 F.2d 1347, 1349 (8th Cir. 1981) (same), with Brown v. Marquette Say. & Loan Ass'n, 686 F.2d
608, 615 (7th Cir. 1982) (allowing one recovery to joint obligors in light of the 1980 amendment's
clarification on the issue).
189. Brown v. Marquette Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 686 F.2d 608 (7th Cir. 1982).
190. Id at 615 (citing 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 49.11 (4th
ed. 1973 & Supp. 1983)).
[Vol. 19:30
31
Griffith: Recent Developments in the Effort to Simplify Truth in Lending
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1983
SIMPLIFYING TRUTH IN LENDING
tent in enacting the penalty provision. The court seemed convinced
that it had found the "more convincing evidence"' 19 which it wanted.
It is clear that the Seventh Circuit has reversed itself and has joined the
Fourth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits in limiting joint debtors to a single
recovery. However, although the Eighth Circuit192 and the Fifth Cir-
cuit' 93 have both had opportunities since the passage of the Simplifica-
tion Act to reflect on the effect of the amendment restricting obligors to
a single recovery, they still allow each obligor to recover the statutory
penalty in pre-Simplification Act cases. It is also significant that the
Seventh Circuit has repudiated Mirabal v. General Finance Acceptance
Corp. In Andersen v. Farmers Bank the Eighth Circuit found the
Mirabal reasoning to be persuasive and the statute to be unambigu-
ous.' 94 The court did not discuss the amendment in reaching its con-
clusion and relied strictly on the Mirabal approach. But the Seventh
Circuit in Brown did not agree with the Eighth Circuit in Andersen that
the language was unambiguous or that the Mirabal decision supported
that proposition. Instead the Seventh Circuit read the Mirabal decision
as a close case and indicated that there was some ambiguity in the lan-
guage of the statute. 95
VIII. LATE PAYMENTS
Under old Regulation Z a creditor was supposed to disclose "[t]he
amount, or method of computing the amount, of any default, delin-
quency, or similar charges payable in the event of late payments."'' 96
There was for some time a serious question whether an acceleration
clause could be characterized as a default, delinquency or similar
charge. The matter was eventually settled by the United States
Supreme Court in Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin. "I The Court
held that a "charge" means a sum of money assessed by the creditor
against the debtor and that acceleration did not come within that defi-
nition.' 98 The Court noted that charges are payable in the event of late
payment. In no way, therefore, could acceleration be regarded as a
sum payable to the creditor in the event of late payment, and the term
191. 686 F.2d at 615 (quoting Mirabal v. General Fin. Acceptance Corp., 537 F.2d at 883).
192. Andersen v. Farmers Bank, 640 F.2d 1347 (8th Cir. 1981).
193. White v. World Fin., 653 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1981).
194. 640 F.2d at 1349.
195. 686 F.2d at 615 n.3.
196. 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(b)(4) (1981).
197. 444 U.S. 555 (1980).
198. Id at 561.
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could not logically fit within section 226.8(b)(4).199
The statute continued to cause problems. In Pittman v. Money
Mart, Inc. 2 0 the creditor disclosed only that it could collect a default
charge of five percent of an unpaid installment, not to exceed five dol-
lars. The debtor complained that the use of the term "may" did not
give him adequate notice of the exact conditions under which the
charge would actually be imposed. The debtor wanted the creditor to
disclose either that it would always collect the default charge or to dis-
close the situations in which it would or would not do so. The court
nevertheless held that the creditor had complied with the disclosure
provisions.2 °' It agreed that the Federal Reserve Board's judgment
about the sufficiency of disclosures should not be disturbed unless
clearly irrational.2 °2
The revised regulation changes the disclosure requirements for
late payments.20 3 The creditor must disclose late payment charges as a
dollar percentage charge that may be added to individual delinquent
installments, as long as the creditor regards the transaction as continu-
ing. The new definition makes it clear that the right of acceleration is
definitely excluded because of the requirement that the disclosure re-
flect a dollar or percentage charge.2 4 But the definition also takes care
of the point raised inPittman by specifically requiring disclosure of any
charge that may be imposed. The new language allows the creditor
discretion to impose the late charge and enough flexibility to ignore the
late charge in appropriate circumstances. 205
IX. DISCLOSURE OF SECURITY INTERESTS
Before Regulation Z was revised, a creditor was required to dis-
close a security interest which he obtained in connection with his exten-
sion of credit to a consumer.2 6 The regulation defined a security
interest as "any interest in property which secures payment or perform-
199. Id at 561-62 (construing 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(b)(4) (1979)).
200. 636 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1981).
201. Id at 997.
202. Id at 996 (citing Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. at 568).
203. 12 C.F.R. § 226.18(1) (1983).
204. FRB Official Staff Interpretations para. 18(1)(1), 12 C.F.R. Supp. I at 722 (1983).
205. See, e.g., Dryden v. Lou Budke's Arrow Fin. Co., 630 F.2d 641 (8th Cir. 1980) (late
charge not assessed against new owner assuming the debt).
206. Regulation Z required the following disclosure in credit other than open end credit: "A
description or identification of the type of any security interest held or to be retained or acquired
by the creditor in connection with the extension of credit, and a clear identification of the property
to which the security interest relates. ... 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(b)(5) (1981).
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ance of an obligation."2 °7 If that definition seemed simple, it was not
clear enough to avoid disagreements over whether unearned insurance
premiums should be disclosed as a security interest.2"8 The definition
set out some examples of a security interest, but did not purport to be a
limiting provision.20 9
It was possible, therefore, for other interests to come within the
definition of a security interest. Although the language seemed general
enough to encompass a creditor's interest in unearned insurance premi-
ums, there was doubt whether such incidental interests were the type
contemplated for disclosure under Truth in Lending. Knowing
whether a creditor had such an interest would not be very helpful to a
consumer who wanted to compare the terms of credit available from
various sources. A critical element of the financing might be the risk of
losing the property subject to the lender's security interest. Therefore,
the problem was to decide whether disclosure of a creditor's rights to
something like unearned insurance premiums should be included
within the definition of "security interest" when it was not the intention
of Truth in Lending to provide information which would not be useful
in a consumer's comparison of credit terms.
It remained for the Supreme Court in Anderson Brothers Ford v.
Valencia21 ° to decide the question. The consumer purchased an auto-
mobile on credit and assigned to the creditor-seller all money due
under the automobile insurance policy, including "returned or
unearned premiums."2 1' The Court held that the assignment of such
premiums was not a security interest that had to be disclosed.2" 2
207. 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(gg) (1981). The revised regulation defines it as "an interest in property
that secures performance of a consumer credit obligation. ... 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(25) (1983).
208. The circuits were split on the issue of whether or not the Act requires such disclosure.
Compare Murphy v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 629 F.2d 556, 560 (8th Cir. 1980), vacated and re-
manded, 452 U.S. 957 (1981); Edmondson v. Allen-Russell Ford, Inc., 577 F.2d 291, 292 (5th Cir.
1978); Gennuso v. Commercial Bank & Trust Co., 566 F.2d 437, 442 (3d Cir. 1977) (per curiam)
(all requiring disclosure of a security interest in unearned insurance premiums) with James v. Ford
Motor Credit Co., 638 F.2d 147, 150 (10th Cir. 1980) (no disclosure of unearned insurance pre-
mium required) cert. denied, 453 U.S. 901 (1981).
209. Section 226.2(gg) provided in pertinent part as follows:
The terms include, but are not limited to, security interests under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, real property mortgages, deeds of trust, and other consensual or confessed
liens whether or not recorded, mechanic's, materialmen's, artisan's, and other similar
liens, vendor's liens in both real and personal property, the interest of a seller in a con-
tract for the sale of real property, any lien on property arising by operation of law, and
any interest in a lease when used to secure payment or performance of an obligation.
12 C.F.R. § 226.2(gg) (1981).
210. 452 U.S. 205 (1981).
211. Id at 207.
212. Id at 222.
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The Court relied on a proposed Official Staff Interpretation which
held that the right to receive insurance premiums was not subject to
disclosure.2 1 3 But the Court also looked to the definition of "security
interest" in revised Regulation Z which specifically excludes "premium
rebates." '14 It had to decide whether the definition in the revised regu-
lation was intended to change the meaning of the term in the old regu-
lation. Significantly, the original security interest provision in the
Truth in Lending Act was enacted to warn the consumer that his home
would be subject to a security interest. 215 Taking all this into account,
the Court upheld the Board's view that the assignment of unearned
insurance proceeds should not be a required disclosure.21 6
It is noteworthy that the majority of the Court relied on an unoffi-
cial staff interpretation that was not yet effective at the time of the suit,
rather than on a clear statement on the question in the old regulation.
In addition, while the definition in the revised regulation provided the
Court with a clear understanding of the place of "incidental inter-
ests,"-that they should be excluded from a disclosure statement2 17-
the dissenters were quite concerned that the Court seemed to apply the
revised regulation retroactively.218 The new regulation was issued to
implement a new statute that was not retroactive, raising some question
about the regulation's relevance. The dissent believed that Congress
was changing the law in 1980 with the Simplification Act and that there
was no evidence that Congress intended to construe the old law appli-
cable to the case. 219 By so arguing, the dissent raised an issue that will
be with us for a little longer: the proper interpretation of language
under the old provisions in light of the new Act and regulation. In
some cases the old law will still apply because of violations which arose
before the effective date of the Simplification Act.
Under the new regulation, disclosure is required if a particular in-
terest in property is a security interest under applicable state law.220
The definition excludes interests in after-acquired property, interests
213. FRB Proposed Official Staff Interpretation FG-0173, 45 Fed. Reg. 63,295 (1980).
214. 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(25) (1983).
215. The original draft of the bill did not require disclosure of a security interest. Representa-
tive Cahill offered an amendment requiring such disclosure out of a concern for consumers whose
homes might be secured by a mortgage. 114 CONG. REc. 1610-11 (1968).
216. 452 U.S. at 222.
217. 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(25) (1983).
218. 452 U.S. at 231 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
219. Id
220. 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(25) (1983).
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that arise solely by operation of law, and incidental interests.2"' Inci-
dental interests are excluded; they exist only because of the primary
security interest. The characterization of an interest as an incidental
interest does not depend upon the importance that the creditor attaches
to the property, however, and placing more reliance on some property
does not necessarily convert all other property to the category of inci-
dental interests. 2 The incidental interest category includes accessories
to the primary security. Accessories added to an automobile, for exam-
ple, would be incidental because the automobile would be the primary
security. 23 Creditors should be relieved by the simple requirement of
the revised regulation that they need disclose only the fact that they
will have a security interest in the property purchased in the transac-
tion, or in other property identified by item or type. 24
Some creditors are trapped by their use of overbroad language. If
the disclosure statement is too broad, it may not properly describe the
security interest.2 ' The revised regulation has simplified matters, but
creditors must still be wary of sweeping language that does not prop-
erly identify the "other property" by item or type in the case of a lien
that is not a purchase-money security interest.
Creditors should also note that although liens which arise by oper-
ation of law need not be disclosed under the general requirements for
open-end and closed-end transactions, such liens must be disclosed in
rescindable transactions. 26
221. Id However, for purposes of the right of rescission, under §§ 226.15 and 226.23, the term
includes interests that arise solely by operation of law. Id
222. Gray v. I.T.T. Thorp Corp., 101 Ill. App. 3d 167, 169-71, 427 N.E.2d 1284, 1286-87 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1981) (construing similar provisions of the Ill. Consumer Installment Loan Act, ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 74, § 66(k) (1977)).
223. FRB Official Staff Interpretation para. 2(a)(25)-3, 12 C.F.R. Supp. I at 674 (1983).
224. 12 C.F.R. § 226.18(m) (1982). Prior to the 1980 revision, Regulation Z contained more
stringent disclosure requirements. Former § 226.8(b)(5) provided as follows: "If after-acquired
property will be subject to the security interest, or if other or future indebtedness is or may be
secured by an such property, this fact shall be clearly set forth in conjunction with the description
or identification of the type of security interest held, retained or acquired." 12 C.F.R.
§ 226.8(b)(5) (1981).
225. Bizier v. Globe Fin. Serv. Inc., 654 F.2d I (1st Cir. 1981). The disclosure statement listed
a security interest in the consumer's home and also in after-acquired property. The mortgage gave
a security interest in the house only. The disclosure statement therefore identified a broader se-
curity interest than the mortgage itself and did not properly describe the security interest. Id at 3.
See also Franklin v. Community Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 629 F.2d 514, 516 (8th Cir. 1980),
(disclosure statement misleading where it provides for a security interest in after-acquired prop-
erty which is greater than that allowed under state law); In re Sherman, 13 Bankr. 259, 261-62
(D.R.I. 1981) (disclosure too broad because it mentioned collateral not included in the security
agreement).
226. 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(25) (1983).
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The difficulty caused by imprecision is reflected in Pridgeon v.
Gates Credit Union .227 In that case the disclosure statement provided
that the security agreement could cover after-acquired property while
the security agreement itself read that the note would be secured by
after-acquired collateral.22 8 The consumer argued that the difference
in terms violated the clear mandate of section 226.8(b)(5), which re-
quired that the creditor clearly set forth the fact that after-acquired
property would be subject to the security interest.2 29 The Seventh Cir-
cuit disagreed and relied on the views expressed in a Federal Reserve
Board Staff Opinion.2 30 The Board suggested that a simple disclosure
of the fact that after-acquired property could be subject to the security
interest would be sufficient to comply with the clear language of section
226.8(b)(5). The court also approved the creditor's disclosure statement
because it referred to the security agreement which in turn "expressly
provided that the Promissory Note was in fact secured by after-ac-
quired property. 2 31 This incorporation by reference should be toler-
ated only if the disclosure statement and the security agreement are
consistent. Considerable deference is generally due to the Board's
opinion because the Board is the agency charged with enforcement of
Truth in Lending,2 32 but if the creditor's disclosure statement does not
agree with the security agreement, the purpose of disclosure is in doubt.
This problem of interpretation will not disappear under the re-
vised regulation. Section 226.18(m) 33 requires the creditor to disclose,
if applicable, the fact that he has or will acquire a security interest. A
court should dissuade a creditor from using slightly different language
which does not give the consumer the information mandated by the
regulation. Although section 226.18(p) 234 allows the creditor to use the
disclosure statement to refer the consumer to the contract for further
details about various items, that freedom should not be taken as a li-
cense to provide conflicting information. It is particularly crucial in the
case of a security interest because a consumer wants to know which
property, if any, will be subject to the security interest. 235
227. 683 F.2d 182 (7th Cir. 1982).
228. Id at 194.
229. Id
230. FRB Staff Opinion No. 153, CONSUMER CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 31, 393 (May 28, 1976).
231. 683 F.2d at 195.
232. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 566 (1980).
233. 12 C.F.R. § 226.18(m) (1983).
234. Id § 226.18(p).
235. The same observation may be made about a prepayment penalty. The revised regulation
requires "a statement indicating whether or not a penalty may be imposed if the obligation is
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X. CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that there has been substantial progress in clari-
fying the elements of consumer credit. The Simplification Act has in-
troduced some changes that will simplify matters for consumers and
creditors. The specific language allowing a court to vary the rescission
procedure in appropriate circumstances relieves creditors of the rigid
statutory requirement of responding to a consumer's rescission notice.
Now those creditors can move forward with some confidence, espe-
cially if they seek judicial approval.
There has also been some clarification of the term "creditor." Al-
though the Simplification Act provided a new definition of the term,236
it took a second amendment to exclude arrangers. 37 But now the full
thrust of the term has been placed where it belongs, on the person who
lends the money or extends the credit. This definition is much more
realistic and promotes a clearer understanding of the responsibilities of
the parties in a credit transaction, particularly in the creditor-assignee
relationship.
The Simplification Act has also settled the long dispute about
double recovery in joint obligor transactions. It was always obvious
that the creditor's violation with respect to "any person' ' 238 was not a
reliable indicator of his total liability when more than one obligor was
involved. The other matters discussed have given some flavor of the
current litigation. As time goes on and disagreements arise about inter-
pretation, more simplification will be necessary.
prepaid in full." 12 C.F.R. § 226.18(k) (1983). That information puts the consumer on notice
about the creditor's policy on prepayment. If the penalty may be imposed, the creditor has the
option of enforcing it. The consumer should then go to the contract for the specific terms of the
prepayment penalty. In that situation, the consumer would be primarily interested in ascertaining
the amount of the penalty. There is no inconsistency between this additional information and the
statement in the disclosure form that a prepayment penalty may be imposed.
236. Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 602(a), 94 Stat.
132, 168 (1980).
237. Gain-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 702(a), 96
Stat. 1469, 1538, (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1602(f) (1982)).
238. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1982).
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